سياسات وبرامج التحفيز المقترحة لتطوير الصناعة في قطاع غزة by Elfarra, Majed
 ﺴﻴﺎﺴﺎﺕ ﻭﺒﺭﺍﻤﺞ ﺍﻟﺘﺤﻔﻴﺯ ﺍﻟﻤﻘﺘﺭﺤﺔ  ﻟﺘﻁﻭﻴﺭ ﺍﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻗﻁﺎﻉ ﻏﺯﺓ
 tnempoleveD yrtsudnI s’azaG rof sevitnecnI fo semmargorP dna seiciloP desoporP
 ﻣﺎﺟﺪ ﺍﻟﻔﺮﺍ . ﺩ
 
 ﻣـﺆﺗﻤﺮ 
 
 ــﺪ اﻻﻧﺴﺤــﺎب اﻹﺳــﺮاﺋﻴــﻠــﻲــﺰة ﺑﻌــــ          ﻄـﻮﻳــــﺮ ﻗﻄــــــﺎع ﻏـــــ                ﺗﻨﻤﻴــــﺔ وﺗ     
386
 ﺑﺴﻢ ﺍ ﺍﻟﺮﲪﻦ ﺍﻟﺮﺣﻴﻢ
 
  
 
 
 
 
 ﺑﻌﻨﻮانورﻗﺔ ﻋﻤﻞ 
 
ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺎت وﺑﺮاﻣﺞ اﻟﺘﺤﻔﻴﺰ اﻟﻤﻘﺘﺮﺣﺔ  ﻟﺘﻄﻮﻳﺮ اﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺔ 
 ﻓﻲ ﻗﻄﺎع ﻏﺰة
 
 
 
 ﺮـﺆﺗﻤـﻰ ﻣـ إﻟــﺔﻣﻘﺪﻣ
 
 ﺗﻨﻤﻴــﺔ وﺗﻄــﻮﻳﺮ ﻗﻄــــــﺎع  ﻏـــﺰة
 ﺑﻌﺪ اﻻﻧﺴﺤﺎب اﻹﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻲ
 
 ﺭﺓ ﰲ ﺍﳉﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﺍﻹﺳﻼﻣﻴﺔ ﺎﺍﳌﻨﻌﻘﺪ ﺑﻜﻠﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﺠ
 ﻡ6002  ﻓﱪﺍﻳﺮ 51 - 31ﰲ ﺍﻟﻔﺘﺮﺓ ﻣﻦ 
 
 :ﻦـﻣﺔ ﺪﻣـﻣﻘ
 ﻤﺎﺠﺩ ﻤﺤﻤﺩ ﺍﻟﻔﺭﺍ/ ﺍﻟﺩﻜﺘﻭﺭ
 ﺃﺴﺘﺎﺫ ﺍﻹﺩﺍﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﻤﺸﺎﺭﻙ
  ﺍﻟﺠﺎﻤﻌﺔ ﺍﻹﺴﻼﻤﻴﺔ–ﻜﻠﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﺠﺎﺭﺓ 
 AB DMM ABM D.hP ,roseforP etaicossA ,arraF-lE dejaM
 tnemeganaM & ssenisuB fo tnemtrapeD
 azaG fo ytisrevinU cimalsI ,ecremmoC fo ytlucaF
 
 
  ﻡ6002  ﻓﱪﺍﻳﺮ
 ﺴﻴﺎﺴﺎﺕ ﻭﺒﺭﺍﻤﺞ ﺍﻟﺘﺤﻔﻴﺯ ﺍﻟﻤﻘﺘﺭﺤﺔ  ﻟﺘﻁﻭﻴﺭ ﺍﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻗﻁﺎﻉ ﻏﺯﺓ
 tnempoleveD yrtsudnI s’azaG rof sevitnecnI fo semmargorP dna seiciloP desoporP
 ﻣﺎﺟﺪ ﺍﻟﻔﺮﺍ . ﺩ
 
 ﻣـﺆﺗﻤﺮ 
 
 ــﺪ اﻻﻧﺴﺤــﺎب اﻹﺳــﺮاﺋﻴــﻠــﻲــﺰة ﺑﻌــــ          ﻄـﻮﻳــــﺮ ﻗﻄــــــﺎع ﻏـــــ                ﺗﻨﻤﻴــــﺔ وﺗ     
486
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ﺘﻌﺎﻨﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﺸﺂﺕ ﺍﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻗﻁﺎﻉ ﻏﺯﺓ ﻤﻥ ﻀﻌﻑ ﻭﺠﻤﻭﺩ ﺸﺩﻴﺩﻴﻥ، ﻓﻤﻨﺫ ﺘﺄﺴﻴﺱ 
 ﻟﻡ ﻴﺘﺤﻘﻕ ﺃﻱ ﺘﻁﻭﺭ ﺫﻭ ﻤﻐﺯﻯ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﺩﺍﺀ ﺍﻟﻘﻁﺎﻉ 4991ﺍﻟﺴﻠﻁﺔ ﺍﻟﻭﻁﻨﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺴﻁﻴﻨﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻋﺎﻡ 
ﺍﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﻲ، ﻓﻼ ﺯﺍل ﺘﺴﻴﻁﺭ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺍﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺼﻐﻴﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﻴﻐﻠﺏ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻁﺎﺒﻊ ﺍﻟﺤﺭﻓﻲ ﺫﺍﺕ 
 5 ﺯﺍل ﻤﻌﺩل ﺍﻟﺘﺸﻐﻴل ﺍﻟﻌﺎﻡ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﺸﺂﺕ ﺍﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﻴﺔ ﻟﻡ ﻴﺼل ﺇﻟﻰ ﺭﺃﺱ ﺍﻟﻤﺎل ﺍﻟﺼﻐﻴﺭ ﻭﻻ 
ﻭﻴﻌﻭﺩ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻀﻌﻑ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻤﻤﺎﺭﺴﺎﺕ . ﺃﺸﺨﺎﺹ ﻭﻴﺘﺼﻑ ﺍﻟﻘﻁﺎﻉ ﺍﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﻲ ﺒﺎﻟﺘﺫﺒﺫﺏ ﺍﻟﺸﺩﻴﺩ 
ﻭﺴﻴﺎﺴﺎﺕ ﺍﻻﺤﺘﻼل ﺍﻹﺴﺭﺍﺌﻴﻠﻲ ﻭﺍﻟﻰ ﻨﻘﺹ ﻭﺍﻟﻤﻬﺎﺭﺓ ﻭﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﻴﺔ ﺒﺄﺼﻭل ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﺍﻹﺩﺍﺭﻴﺔ ﻭﻨﻘﺹ 
ﻭﻴﻌﻭﺩ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﻀﻌﻑ ﻜﺫﻟﻙ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻋﺩﻡ ﺍﻫﺘﻤﺎﻡ . ﺜﻘﺎﻓﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﺼﻨﻴﻊ ﻟﺩﻱ ﺍﻟﻌﺩﻴﺩ ﻤﻥ ﺃﺼﺤﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻤﺼﺎﻨﻊ 
ﺍﻟﺴﻠﻁﺔ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺴﻁﻴﻨﻴﺔ ﺒﺘﻘﺩﻴﻡ ﺍﻟﺩﻋﻡ ﻭﺍﻟﺘﺤﻔﻴﺯ ﻭﺭﺴﻡ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺴﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺩﺍﻋﻤﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻤﻨﺎﺴﺒﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻨﺸﺂﺕ ﺍﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﻴﺔ 
ﻓﻲ ﻗﻁﺎﻉ ﻭﻫﺫﺍ ﺃﺩﻯ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻀﻌﻑ ﺍﻟﻘﺩﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺘﻨﺎﻓﺴﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻨﺎﻋﺔ ﺍﻟﻔﻠﺴﻁﻴﻨﻴﺔ ﻭﺘﺭﺘﺏ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺍﺭﺘﻔﺎﻉ ﻤﻌﺩل 
ﺍﻤﺞ ﺍﻟﺘﺤﻔﻴﺯ ﻭﺍﻟﺩﻋﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﺎﺴﺒﻴﻥ ﻟﻠﻘﻁﺎﻉ ﻭﺘﻬﺩﻑ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺴﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻭﻀﻊ ﺘﺼﻭﺭ ﻟﺒﺭ . ﺍﻟﻔﺸل ﺒﻴﻨﻬﺎ 
ﺍﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﻲ ﻓﻲ ﻗﻁﺎﻉ ﻏﺯﺓ ﺘﻌﺯﻴﺯﺍ ﻟﻘﺩﺭﺘﻪ ﺍﻟﺘﻨﺎﻓﺴﻴﺔ ﻭﺇﻴﺠﺎﺩ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﺎﺥ ﺍﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﺎﺴﺏ ﻟﻠﺘﻁﻭﻴﺭ 
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1- Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to identify the policies, programmes which are needed 
to improve the industrial sector in the Gaza Strip. The study focuses on the policies 
which are needed to be implemented “immediately”1 rather than those which might be 
envisaged within long-term scenarios. It is important to point out that the measures 
and projects which are essential to improve and develop industry in the Gaza Strip are 
deeply intertwined, that it will be extremely difficult to draw a demarcation line 
between those needed to be achieved immediately and those required at a later point 
in time. The selection of appropriate projects and relevant implementation modalities 
along any point on this spectrum is contingent on overriding economic, political and 
technological circumstances of the territory.  
The study employs both primary and secondary data collected in the following 
manner: 
1) Palestinian Statistics. 
2) Reviewing the literature including, books, reports, statistics and articles. 
 
This study consists of  two sections: 1) The Characteristics of Gaza's industrial 
establishments; 2) policies and programmes of incentives. 
 
2- The Characteristics of Gaza's industrial establishments 
During the Israeli occupation period (1967-1993) Gaza’s economy remained 
undeveloped (world Bank, 1993). Industrial establishments were mainly dominated by 
small-scale establishments and with low capitalization levels (Central Bureau of 
Statistics (CBS), 1994). The Israeli occupation’s policies had contributed significantly 
to the underdevelopment of Gaza’s economy (El-Farra and Macmillan, 1999). In 
addition, there were some other internal constraints contributed to the problem. The 
internal constraints were mainly attributed to the local business owners and managers 
in their lack of experience in management, production and marketing (El-Farra & 
Wakelam, 1999). 
During the Palestine National Authority (PNA) period2 the characteristics of 
Gaza’s industrial establishments were very similar to the pre-1994 period. Table 1 
shows than in 2003 Palestinian industry consists of 13,693 establishments with total 
employment at about 60,186 persons. PNA industrial establishments are still 
dominated by small-scale establishments with average employment size of about 4.4 
persons in 2003. It contributed with12.5% only to the total employment in the PNA 
(Table 1). However, it contributed with 9% only to Gaza’s employment in 2003 (El-
Farra, Rafati, 2005). 
                                                 
1 Short-term  and medium-term strategies. 
2 The PNA was established since 1994 after the signing of transitional agreement between Israel and 
the PLO. 
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Low capitalization level was a characteristic feature of PNA establishments. 
Gaza’s overall establishment has average invested capital at about $10,000 per 
establishment in year 2003. Low employment and low invested capital in Gaza’s 
industrial establishments reflected negatively on the level of productivity in Gaza’s 
establishments. Table (1) reveals that industrial sector contributed with 15.2% to PNA 
GDP in 2003.  
Table 1 – 
Some Industrial Indicators in the Palestinian Territories 
year 
industrial 
Contribution 
to the PNA 
Employment 
% 
industrial 
Contribution 
to the PNA 
GDP % 
Number of 
Persons 
Engaged 
Number of 
Industrial 
Establishment
1996 16.2% 11.5% 50,690.0 10,925.0 
1997 15.9% 11.9% 61,775.0 13,464.0 
1998 15.2% 13.2% 63,748.0 14,210.0 
1999 15.5% 17.4% 72,660.0 14,849.0 
2000 14.3% 15.7% 76,918.0 14,509.0 
2001 14% 11.2% 69,572.0 14,605.0 
2002 12.9% 10.8% 65,526.0 14,179.0 
2003 12.5% 15.2% 60,186.0 13,693.0 
Source: Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics. industrial Census, different Issues. 
 Ramallah-Palestine. 
 
 
 The lack of industrial development in Gaza is attributed to the policies of 
Israeli occupation, lack of government support and as well to the local Palestinians 
due to their lack of vital industrial experience, marketing and management. The Israeli 
policies, effectively controlled or at least significantly influenced all major 
dimensions of manufacturing and industrial development - from the funding and 
licensing of investment, through input purchases and provision of physical 
infrastructure to source and market access.  
At the internal level3 the examination of local business attitudes and their managerial 
practices revealed that these practices were hindrances to industrial development. 
                                                 
3 We mean by internal constraints those shortcoming which are attributed to the indigenous 
Palestinians. 
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These constraints may be summarised in  seven points: 1) business locations, the size 
of buildings and their facilities- the majority were rarely suitable for their present, let 
alone their future, needs. The great majority had never conducted feasibility studies 
and in those instances where such studies had been carried out they were either 
inaccurate or never carefully implemented. This was largely attributable to the lack of 
local expertise and to the business owners themselves who were seeking cheap short 
term solutions; 2) shortage of skilled labour in Gaza’s industrial is partly attributed to 
the lack of appropriate education and training for the needs of Gaza’s industry.; 3) the 
majority of industrial establishments rely on imported raw materials and price was the 
most important criterion in their purchase; 4) price again was the most important 
criteria when purchasing machinery; running costs, maintenance, skilled labour for 
the machinery and market capacity for the products were largely ignored; 5) an 
indication of the poor quality of Gaza’s products; 6) there is a widespread 
misunderstanding of the concept of ‘marketing’ which to most firms was synonymous 
with ‘selling’, and 7) the lack of understanding of good management practice have all 
contributed to the lack of industrial development. The concentration on family and 
friends in ownership and recruitment can be seen in the authoritarian management 
style adopted by many companies. Although many firms experienced a shortage of 
capital they are averse to accepting loans or forming common projects outside the 
family. There was often a lack of separation between the owner’s assets and those of 
the firm which often led to liquidity problems for the firms (for further details see, El-
Farra, 2004; El-Farra and Wakelam, 1999).  
With regards to government support, the PNA never adopted real incentive policies 
suitable to Palestinian establishments. The only step was made by the PNA was 
issuing the investment law which mainly suitable for large and external investment. In 
addition, all imports and exports were never organized or monitored to suit PNA 
industries. This resulted in high failure rate among Gaza’s industrial establishments 
(Ashour and El-Farra, 2002). 
  
 
3- Policies and programmes of incentives. 
Over the short- and long-terms, the following incentive policies should be 
adopted: 
1) Advocating Labour-Intensive Industry 
 Reviewing Gaza’s industrial establishments suggested that the majority of the 
industrial sector employed poor, outdated technology. It was also noticed that those 
who used advanced machines faced maintenance problems that were attributed to the 
lack of experience of industrialisation in general and to the lack of reliable technicians 
in particular. It will be necessary for Gaza’s industry to make the most effective use of 
its labour force and facilitate the transfer of  the appropriate new industrial 
technology, to allow for needed advances in productivity and quality. Such transfer of 
technology should be where the level of sophistication and productivity is low, 
particularly in the sub-sectors of  metal, textiles, clothing and wood products. Labour 
intensive industries should be favoured wherever possible. The adoption of the 
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strategy of labour-intensive industries is suitable for Gaza’s unique circumstances, 
where the unemployment rate is very high specially among new graduates. In 2003 
about 44% of Gaza labour force age (15-24) were unemployed (El-Farra and Rafati, 
2005). Gaza should adopt a model which encourages the use of labour-intensive 
technology, while product quality, cost and productivity should not be sacrificed. 
Encouraging labour-intensive technology was stipulated in the Law for 
Encouragement of Investment, which made a link between the amount of invested 
capital and the size of the work force, which is permanently employed on a project. 
Investing $100,000 in a modern factory does not often create permanent jobs for ten 
workers, unless the factory follows a policy of labour-intensive technology. 
2) Incentives for Small-scale Projects 
This study advocates and defends the policy of supporting small-scale industries in 
Gaza as the most appropriate and viable model for the Strip, rather than supporting 
large-scale projects. Introducing such a model can be justified on the bases of a 
number of elements as follows: 
a) It is difficult to monopolise the products of small-scale industries. 
Competition among these industries should encourage the rise of a large 
number of industrialists among the middle class and low-income group. 
The economic situation in the Gaza Strip cannot  stand for monopoly. 
b) The lack of financial resources and the small size of available markets 
locally and regionally dictate that Gaza should follow a policy of 
supporting small-scale industries. Large-scale industries require large 
amounts of capital, technical and administrative skills and large markets 
which are difficult to achieve in the Strip. The recently formed partnerships 
in Gaza died after a few years of their existence. This is due to several 
reasons, including management failure to operate as a team. 
c) Small businesses are probably better able to absorb new workers more 
quickly than large businesses and require relatively little aid and 
professional guidance in comparison to big firms. 
d) An obvious problem which Gaza faces is the inability to attract significant 
foreign investment. This problem will continue for several years, because 
the competition will be significantly high with the surrounding regional 
economies, and Israel will be the most attractive economy in the region. 
The lack of attractive investment opportunities in Gaza is primarily due to 
the structural imbalances and distortions in the local economy and the lack 
of political stability. Even if the suggested industrial development 
programmes were applied, Gaza will remain, at least in the short-term, 
relatively unattractive to foreign investments. 
e) The large-scale industries need a large number of highly qualified workers 
in the technical and administrative fields. These qualified people usually 
demand high wages. Gaza lacks such skilled people and paying them high 
wages is beyond its available resources. Therefore, during the initial stages, 
the small-scale industries could constitute centres for training and some of 
their workers can gain good qualifications which are needed for large-scale 
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industries. Such qualified and skilled workers could shift to work in large-
scale industries in the future. 
f) Developing and enhancing the small-scale industries facilitates the 
geographical diffusion of industries. It is possible to spread such small-
scale industries to the areas which require economic activities for job 
creation, thereby increasing the purchasing power of regional residents. 
This strategy helps to enhance and spread industrial and administrative 
expertise among a wide spectrum of people in various classes. 
 
 In addition, pursuing a programme suitable to the industries in Gaza may help 
in tackling the structural imbalances of industries and accelerate the process of 
development. According to the recent experience of some countries (e.g., Israel) with 
small businesses, those businesses which enjoyed government support, ranging from 
financial assistance to professional guidance, have managed to expand production, 
increase profits and absorb new workers at relatively little cost (Attiya, 1995). The 
support of small businesses, the newly established and the long standing ones, was 
neglected by the Law of Encouraging Investment in Palestine. 
 In many developing countries, incentives for industrial projects constitute an 
important and integral part of the policy instruments available to create a conducive 
atmosphere for investment in industry and to promote industrialisation. The absence 
of a comprehensive and sustainable incentive policy could be a major obstacle to 
industrialisation in a developing area such as Gaza. The policy of industrial incentives 
involves the use of various policy instruments to attract investment and direct it to 
fulfil specific development objectives. The general objectives of these incentives may 
include reducing the cost of the project’s establishment, helping to identify viable 
investment opportunities, feasible financing, cost of input concessions and import 
duties concessions. Industries in their early stages of development are likely to have 
high initial costs thus impairing their ability to compete with imports. Tariff 
protection for infant industries will have the effect of raising the price of imported 
goods to domestic buyers, which will induce them to increase their consumption of 
import substitutes at higher prices than would otherwise have been the case, but will 
keep the price competitively lower than that of imports. “These higher prices attract 
resources into the import-competing industries and cause output to expand. This is the 
protective effect of the tariff “ (Corden, 1980, p. 48). 
 Tariff protection is not the best policy for promoting industry because of its 
resource allocation and income distribution effects. Protection means favouring a 
certain sector relative to other sectors of the economy. This in turn will induce factors 
of production to shift to the favoured sector but at loss of economic efficiency. The 
income distribution effects of the tariff result from this adverse income effect on 
consumers due to the rise in domestic prices. Import duty concessions are widely used 
in many developing countries as an important incentive to promote industry. This is a 
more preferable mechanism to tariff barriers for the support of local industries 
(Khirbash, 1990). 
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3) Mechanisms for Promoting Small-scale Industries in the Gaza Strip 
The following are some suggested mechanisms that may be used to assist 
small industries in Gaza: 
a) Business Advisory Unit 
 The project should be supported by experts in the business sector and related 
areas. These experts should be able to provide instruction and consultation services to 
help small businesses and factories to become more efficient and to improve their 
management skills, business performance and profitability. The experts should 
provide guidance on a variety of subjects, including general management, production 
management, marketing and financial management, human resources management, 
information systems, and quality control. The business monitoring programme should 
target the following projects: 
i) Projects which employ ten persons or less4. 
ii) Industries located in designated areas for industry, and areas which have 
limited industrial activities such as the southern part of Gaza. 
iii) Industries which have forward and backward linkages either with other 
industries or the agricultural sector which include animal feed, cartoon, plastic 
and food products. It is important to establish connections between Gaza’s 
productive sectors, in order to reduce the industrial cost because of high-cost 
imported material and to solve the problem of marketing of agricultural 
products and gaining better income from these products. 
 
The business monitoring institution should have four stages: 
a) An introductory meeting will be set up to decide if the business is 
appropriate for the project. 
b) The co-ordinator will decide which expert is best suited to be consulted on 
this case and the owner will be asked to give his approval to this decision. 
c) The needs of the business will be defined and the appropriate conclusions 
will be given. 
d) The recommendations of the experts will be implemented, and their 
guidance and directions will be continued. 
 
 According to the experience of countries who adopted this assistance 
mechanism (e.g., Israel) a significant number of the industries which enjoyed this 
service have become more profitable, and businesses have expanded and hired 
additional employees (Attiya, 1995). 
b) Loan-Fund  to Help Small Industries 
 The aim of this fund is to provide soft loans to help individuals establish or 
expand small industries. This fund will be designed to help entrepreneurs to obtain 
credit, which is difficult to achieve, especially for new businesses because banks insist 
                                                 
4 This study considers that industries employ ten persons or less small-scale and 11+ persons large-
scale. 
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on receiving securities from the borrower which are worth more than the actual loan. 
This loan fund should be administered by a local Bank and the suggested industrial 
investment bank. Finance may be given to businesses to purchase equipment or for 
working capital. The loan should be for a period of five years, and in the first year of 
the business, it should not be required to pay back anything. The loan which may be 
granted should not exceed $20,000 in order to avail this service to a large number of 
businesses. In order to prevent abuse of the fund, the borrower should  present as a 
security the lien on the fixed assets financed by the loan and a personal guarantee. The 
loan process should commence by filling out the required forms, which should be 
made available at the two banks. The industrialist will be requested to produce a plan 
for the business, which will be carefully examined. A committee will be established 
by the Ministry of economy to co-ordinate between the banks. The committee will 
oversee the applications submitted to the banks and monitor their implementation. 
c) Fund to Promote Industrial Exports 
 This institution should aim to boost exports by sharing the responsibility for 
risks which the exporters assume. In addition, the fund should highlight the 
importance of marketing orientation and use of the necessary tools to achieve optimal 
marketing skills. The fund shall also provide exporters with credits, earmarked for 
developing marketing programmes and other marketing innovations. 
 
4) Conclusions 
Gaza’s industrial establishments are undeveloped. They are dominated by small-scale 
establishments and with low capitalization level. The Israeli policies, lack of local 
experts in management and production and lack of government support to the sector 
were contributed to the problem. The study concluded that the PNA should a practical 
incentive policies to upgrade industrial sector in the Gaza Strip. The absence of a 
comprehensive and sustainable incentive policy could be a major obstacle to 
industrialisation in Gaza. The policy of industrial incentives involves the use of 
various policy instruments which may include reducing the cost of the project’s 
establishment, helping to identify viable investment opportunities, feasible financing, 
cost of input concessions and import duties concessions. Industries in their early 
stages of development are likely to have high initial costs thus impairing their ability 
to compete with imports. 
The following incentive policies and programmes need to be adopted in order to 
alleviate the underdevelopment of the sector: 
1- Advocate labour intensive industry to absorb the high unemployment rate in 
the Strip. The model of labour-intensive technology should be applied while 
product quality, cost and productivity should be maintained.  
2- Provide incentives and support for small-scale projects. This incentives should 
be provided to small newly established and existed ones. The mechanisms of 
incentive programmes include: 1) business advisory unit. This project should 
be supported by experts in the business. This advisory unit should provide 
consultation services to small businesses to become more effective in 
management, marketing and production. 2) loan-fund to help small industries. 
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This fund should provide soft loans to individuals who establish or expand 
small industries. This fund will be designed to help entrepreneurs to obtain 
credit which is difficult to get from other sources. The loan should not exceed 
$20000 and to be repaid over 5 years and the recipients should be exempted in 
the first year. 3) Establish fund to promote industrial exports. This fund aims 
to boost exports by sharing responsibility for risks which the exporters 
assume. This fund should highlight the importance of marketing orientation 
and to achieve optimal marketing skills for Gaza’s businesses. 
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